Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Wasatch Crest Insurance Company, in Liquidation,
Wasatch Crest Mutual Insurance Company, In
Liquidation, and D. Kent Michie v. LWP Claims
Administrators Corp., LWP Claims Solutions, Inc. :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin C. Barnes; Charles R. Brown; Jennifer A. James; Clyde Snow Sessions Swenson; Attorneys for
Appellees.
John P. Harrington; Cecilia M. Romero; Holland and Hart LLP; J. Ray Barrios, Jr, Liquidation Office
General Counsel; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wasatch Crest Insurance Company v. LWP Claims Administrators Corp, No. 20051102 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6167

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION,
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and D. KENT
MICHIE, Liquidator,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS,
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,

Case No. 20051102
Trial Court No. 030915527

Defendants/Appellees.
From the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson Presiding
John P. Harrington (5242)
Cecilia M. Romero (9570)
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -1031
(801)799-5800
J. Ray Barrios, Jr. (3915)
Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Jennifer A. James
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)322-2516
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

LIQUIDATION OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL

215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 799-7406
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
WASATCH CREST INSURANCE
COMPANY, IN LIQUIDATION,
WASATCH CREST MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, IN
LIQUIDATION, and D. KENT
MICHIE, Liquidator,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
LWP CLAIMS ADMINISTRATORS,
CORP., a California corporation, and
LWP CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC., a
California corporation,

Case No. 20051102
Trial Court No. 030915527

Defendants/Appellees.
From the Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson Presiding
John P. Harrington (5242)
Cecilia M. Romero (9570)
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031
(801) 799-5800
J. Ray Barrios, Jr. (3915)
Edwin C. Barnes
Charles R. Brown
Jennifer A. James
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

201 South Main, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801)322-2516
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

LIQUIDATION OFFICE GENERAL COUNSEL

215 South State Street, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 799-7406
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

ARGUMENT

3

I. COMMON OWNERSHIP OR OPERATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR
THE COURT TO PRESUME CONTROL

3

A. The Liquidator Presented Evidence of Common Management
and Control

5

B.

There Were Disputed Material Issues of Fact Regarding the
Extent of LWP's Control of Insurance and Mutual

II. "DISTRIBUTION" AND "DIVIDEND" ARE NOT
SYNONYMOUS
A. The Trial Court Did Not Adhere To the Rules of Statutory
Construction
CONCLUSION

7
9
12
14

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
American Western Life Ins. Company in Liquidation v. Leland A. Wolf

12

Downey State Bankv. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978)

4

Ferro v. Utah Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)

5

Hebertson v. Bank One, 1999 UT App. 342, 995 P.2d 7

4

Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., All P.2d 150 (Utah 1970)

9

In re Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

11, 12
9

Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, 48 P.3d
888 (Utah 2000)

11, 12
STATE STATUTES

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-102(13)

13

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-1-301(5)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-l-301-27(a)& 27(b)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§31A-5-418

13

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-16-105

13

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-16-106

13

UTAH CODE ANN.

§31A-27-322

3,9,10

4,5,6,7

ii

6, 7

INTRODUCTION
While LWP is correct that the I iqi lidatoi seeks to recoup all payments
made to LWP as an affiliate under the Utah Insurance Code § 31A-27-322
(hereafter the "Statute"), it incorrectly argues that the Liquidator somehow
conceded no wrongdoing by not pleading that the payments to LWP were other
than fair compensatiot i Quite simpl> , the applicable statute does not require
that the Liquidator plead such allegations and they therefore were intentioilally
not pled.
In addition to factual inaccuracies, LWP raises new arguments in its
opposing brief tl lat must be addressed, First, LWP incorrectly argues that "the
Liquidator did not plead or ,ttlempl to pro\e liiut I.W'

- -. i mate that

controlled Insurance or Mutual." The Statute does not require factual evidence
of actual control. The Liquidator did in fact present evidence of common
management and the ability to control-which qualifies as one of the three ways
to demonstrate affiliate shit us, Regardless, 1 ""vYi" concedes that it was an affiliate
and the Trial Court acknowledges LWP's explicit admission in its ()idei, 111.
2437).
Second, LWP and the Trial Court misinterpret the statutory requirement
of control
contravention t

Court required proof of actual control. This is in direct
:;

.. Statute's ilHiiiifioiul sec (mil

\s set forth hv TtyI " the

definitional section, § 31A-1-301(5), delineates three types of affiliates: one that
controls, one that is controlled, and one that is under common control and
management. The error in LWP's argument is that it then goes on to argue that
§ 31A-27-322 limits its application to only one of the three types of affiliates—
one that controls. This interpretation would make § 31 A-1-301 surplusage,
meaningless and in direct opposition to the principles of statutory interpretation.
Further, this interpretation completely ignores and disregards the plain language
of the definitional section of the Statute. Rather, given the choice of three
different types of affiliates to choose from, the Liquidator seeks to recoup
payments based on the common/overlapping management option.
Finally, LWP advances an incorrect statutory interpretation of
"distributions." Relying on the Statute's use of "dividend" in section 5, LWP
argues that "distribution" and "dividend" are interchangeable. This
interpretation is wrong. Rather, section 5 further clarifies section 4 and each
section deals with a separate but related situation.
Section 4 deals with joint and several liability for any distribution issued
to any person, shareholder or not. Section 5 then further clarifies section 4
explaining, that where a dividend (payments only to shareholders) is given out
under section 4, and the person that received the dividend (i.e., a distribution in
the form of a dividend) is insolvent, the dividend is still recoverable and joint
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and several liability applies for any deficiency. The use of "distribution" and
"dividend" in these two sections clearly demonstrate that "distribution" is being
used as the broad category, with "dividend" as a sub-set of distribution.
ARGUMENT
I.

COMMON OWNERSHIP OR OPERATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR
THE COURT TO PRESUME CONTROL.
Violating the basic principles of statutory construction, LWP argues that

the Court should ignore the definitions of § 31 A-1-3 01 that apply to § 31 A-27322 and instead limit their application. The controlling Statute, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31 A-27-322 states in pertinent part as follows:
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on
behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled
the insurer the amount of distributions, other than
stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock,
made at any time during the five years preceding the
petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation.
This recovery is subject to the limitations of
Subsections (2) through (6).
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-27-322. As agreed to by LWP, the definitional section

of the Utah Insurance Code "delineates three types of affiliates," specifically:
any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with, another person. A corporation
is an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of
ownership, if substantially the same group of natural
persons manages the corporation.
3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31A-1-301(5); Mem. Opp. at 12. The Statute goes onto

define "control," "controlled," and "under common control" as "the direct or
indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person. This control may be . . . by common
management."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-1 -301 (27)(a) and (a)(ii).

The error in LWP's argument is that it argues that only one of the above
three types of affiliates is included in § 31A-27-322. Mem. Opp. at 12. This
interpretation runs counter to the basic principles of statutory construction. In
the present case, the three statutory types of affiliates are alternatives stated in
the disjunctive (i.e., "or"). Thereby, it is necessary to prove that only one of the
provisions is applicable. See, e.g., Hebertson v. Bank One, 1999 UT App 342, f
10, 995 P.2d 7 (because the statute utilizes a disjunctive, by its plain language
the plaintiff need only satisfy one of the conditions set forth by the statute).
That does not mean, however, that only one of the three types of affiliates apply
to § 31A-27-322, as LWP argues. To the contrary, because there are three
separate types of affiliates, all three are applicable and the Liquidator need only
prove that one of the three applies. LWP's construction would impermissibly
render two of the three types of affiliates completely inoperable and mere
surplusage. See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286,
1288 (Utah 1978) (statute should be read so as to avoid making any provisions
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"surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v. Utah Dep Y of Commerce, 828 P.2d
507, 513 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting interpretation that would "rewrite the
Act and impermissibly render the reciprocity provision a complete nullity").
Observing the plain language of the Statute and giving effect to each term
demonstrates that LWP, along with the Trial Court, misinterpreted the plain
language of the Statute, finding that "mere common ownership or operation,...
is [not] a sufficient basis to presume control." (R. 2437).
A.

The Liquidator Presented Evidence of Common Management
and Control.

LWP further misstates that the Liquidator failed to present evidence of
control Mem. Opp. at 14. While the Liquidator is statutorily permitted to
recover from any affiliate any distribution made at any time during the five
years preceding the petition for liquidation, it was not necessary for the
Liquidator to prove or present evidence of actual control; rather it was sufficient
to show common ownership or overlapping management to establish affiliate
status.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-l-301(5) & (27)(a). LWP is an affiliate of

Insurance because there was such common management.
As presented in detail in the Brief of Appellants, the Liquidator presented
evidence of overlapping management by the overlapping leadership positions of
John Igoe and others in LWP and Insurance, the involvement of Mr. Igoe and
other management persons in transactions between LWP and Insurance, the
5

decisions made by the overlapping management team regarding the claims
handling services, the common employees, and the corporate
relationship/ownership of the companies. See Brief at 24-27; (R. 2437, 1944,
2255, 2298-9, 2296, 2300, 2284-2287, 2973, 3393 at 26 and 2399).
The above evidence was submitted to the Trial Court in the Form B
filings, Mr. Colby's affidavit, LWP's own admissions in John Igoe's affidavit
and LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, and confirm that Mr. Igoe and
others operated Group, Insurance, and LWP with one common management,
utilized the same employees, and entered into agreements with each other on
behalf of one another. (R. 2288). While there is "no presumption that an
individual holding an official position with another person controls that person
solely by reason of the position," UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-l-301(27)(b), added
to the other above-mentioned instances of common/overlapping management, it
is indicative of common control.
LWP's argument that the Liquidator was required to show a "complete
identity of management" is also incorrect. Mem. Opp. at 16. The definitional
section of the Statute requires common management, not "complete identity of
management."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-l-301(5) & (27)(a).

LWP itself "freely acknowledged that it was an affiliate of Insurance for a
period of time based on common ownership. It further admitted that there was
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some overlap in management." Mem. Opp. at 15. The Trial Court also found
"[tjhere is no question that LWP was an affiliate o f Insurance. (R. 2437).
LWP and the Trial Court, however, incorrectly wanted proof that "one
subsidiary controlled or was able to direct distributions by another subsidiary of
a common parent." Mem. Opp. at 15; (R. 2977). The plain language of the
Statute does not require this. Rather, choosing one of the three types of affiliates
available, the Liquidator proved that it was under common control. (R. 2437,
1944, 2255, 2298-9, 2296, 2300, 2284-2287, 2973, 3393 at 26 and 2399; see
also, Brief at 24-27). The Liquidator was then only required to demonstrate, as
it did, the "indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of
management and policies" and not actual control.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-l-

301(27)(a). For this reason, the Trial Court's interpretation was directly
contrary to the Statute.
B.

There Were Disputed Material Issues of Fact Regarding the
Extent of LWP's Control of Insurance and Mutual.

Completely disregarding the material issues of fact in dispute regarding
the level and duration of control/management of Insurance, LWP incorrectly
asserts that there were no disputed material facts with respect to Mutual. Mem.
Opp. at 16. This argument is illogical given LWP's statement that "[a]s for
Mutual, it is true that the Liquidator and LWP disagree about whether LWP was

7

an affiliate of Mutual." Mem. Opp. at 16. Affiliate status is the very basis of
the present suit.
LWP's statement that "the Liquidator has never alleged that LWP
controlled Mutual" is contrary to the evidence presented in the affidavit of Mr.
Colby. While LWP correctly states that Mr. Colby testified that Insurance and
Mutual "were managed and controlled by substantially the same group of
persons/' it incorrectly represents this was the only statement of Mr. Colby. (R.
2300). Rather, Mr. Colby, in his position as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of Mutual from 1999 to July of 2003, testified that by nature
of the corporate relationship of Group, Insurance, LWP and Mutual, there was
affiliate status. (R. 2299 at f 11). Mr. Colby states that Mutual shared
employees with Group and Insurance, had common management with LWP and
Insurance which included John Igoe, Dennis Larson, Judy Adlam and others.
(R. 2297-2300). The overlapping management team-such as John Igoe-was
involved in drafting and/or administering services agreement with Mutual and
Insurance, and supervised the day-to-day business activities and records for
Mutual. (R. 2297-2301). Mr. Colby then directly testified that Mutual had
affiliate status. (R. 2300 at 116).
These allegations directly support the Liquidator's allegation of affiliate
status. A material issue of fact was then created with the affidavits submitted by
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LWP wherein Mr. Igoe disclaims affiliate status and specifically disputes Mr.
Colby's testimony. (R. 1940, 2037, 2296-2302; 2396-2403). Given the material
disputed issues of fact regarding Mutual and Insurance, summary judgment was
improper. See, e.g., Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) ("One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact,
precluding the entry of summary judgment."); Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., All
P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1970) (explaining summary judgment is not proper when
there are genuine issues of material fact). It is for that reason that the Liquidator
withdrew its motion for summary judgment with respect to Mutual.
II.

"DISTRIBUTION" AND "DIVIDEND" ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS.
LWP's argument that "distribution" is used synonymously with

"dividend" because of the use of "dividend" under section 4 of the Statute is
unsustainable. Mem. Opp. at 20. Review of section 1 and both sections 4 and 5
is necessary to obtain the full meaning of each and to understand that sections 4
and 5 are consistent with one another-section 5 is merely a further amplification
of section 4.
Sections 1, 4 and 5 of § 31A-27-322 state:
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver
appointed under the order has a right to recover on
9

behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled
the insurer the amount of distributions, other than
stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock,
made at any time during the five years preceding the
petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation.
This recovery is subject to the limitations of
Subsections (2) through (6).
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled
the insurer at the time the distributions were paid is
liable up to the amount of distributions he received.
Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the
insurer at the time the distributions were declared is
liable up to the amount of distributions he would have
received if they had been paid immediately. If two or
more persons are liable regarding the same
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable.
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is
insolvent, all affiliates that controlled that person at the
time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly and
severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the
amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate.
UTAH CODE ANN.

31 A-27-322(l), (4) & (5).

As demonstrated by the plain language, section 4 is discussing joint and
several liability, specifically, where a distribution was paid, any person that
received the distribution is jointly and severally liable. Because a distribution
can be issued to shareholders and/or non-shareholders, this section seeks to
recoup any and all distributions, whether shareholder or not. Section 5 then
further clarifies section 4, explaining that where a dividend (payments only to
shareholders) is given out under section 4, and the person that received the
dividend (i.e., a distribution in the form of a dividend) is insolvent, the dividend
10

is still recoverable and joint and several liability applies for any deficiency. The
"distribution" and "dividend" in sections 4 and 5 are not used synonymously as
LWP argues, but are dealing with two separate but related situations. The
Statute uses "distribution" as the broad category of what can be recovered, and
"dividend" as a sub-set thereof.
This interpretation is further consistent with the legislative history. The
author of the current Utah Insurance Code, Professor Spencer L. Kimball, was
concerned with all "intergroup transactions" and his comments evidence that the
Statute was intended to address all potential abuses with affiliates, not just
dividends. (R. 2278-9, 2333).
LWP also incorrectly argues that the "Liquidator points to no authority for
his position on the meaning of the word 'distribution' beyond a district court
case with no precedential value . . . . " and that the Trial Court abided by the
rules of statutory construction. Mem. Opp. at 19.
The Liquidator bases its interpretation on the plain meaning of the words
of the Statute, and verified the plain meaning of the words by looking at the
legislative intent and purpose of the Statute, as required by Utah law. Water &
Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^f 18,48 P.3d 888, 894
(Utah 2000); In re Gonzales, 2000 UT 28,123, 1 P.3d 1074, 1079. It also
provided the American Western Life Ins. Company in Liquidation v. LelandA.
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Wolf'case where another judge dealt with the exact issue here. (R. 2342-2358).
While this case is not controlling, it is certainly instructive.
A.

The Trial Court Did Not Adhere To the Rules of Statutory
Construction.

The Trial Court did not adhere to the rules of statutory construction. LWP
itself explains that the "trial court looked to the plain meaning of 'distribution'
as defined in other sections of the Utah Code . . . . " Mem. Opp. at 19.
Reviewing the ruling of the Trial Court also evidences that the Trial Court went
beyond the plain meaning of the Statute. (R. 2438, 2974-2980). As explained
by the Utah Supreme Court: "When interpreting a legislative enactment, 'we
look first to the plain language of the act to determine its meaning.'" Keil, 2002
UT 32,1fl8, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (internal citation omitted). The Trial Court did
not first look to the plain language of the Statute to determine the meaning of
"distribution" and "dividend" but rather, looked to "other sections of the Utah
Code." Mem. Opp. at 19; R. 2433, 2974-2980). If the Trial Court found the
terms ambiguous, it should have looked to the "reason, spirit, and sense of the
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute
dealing with the subject.'" In re Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, f 23, 1 P.3d at 1079.
Accordingly, rather than solely looking to other definitions of "distribution" and
"dividend" within the Utah Code, the Trial Court should have deferred to the
legislative history.
12

Regardless, the other code sections cited by LWP either actually support
the Liquidator's interpretation of distribution as the broad category and dividend
as a subset or sub-class of distribution or are completely irrelevant to the present
analysis. LWP cites § 16-10a-102(13), incorrectly stating that it demonstrates
that "distribution is not any transfer of money or property but rather denotes
dividing up and passing out of equity." Mem. Opp. at 20. The plain language of
§ 16-10a-102(13) states that a distribution "means a direct or indirect transfer of
money or other property" and includes many items, such as dividends,
acquisitions of shares or any other forms.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-10a-102(13)

(emphasis added). The plain language of this statute shows that while a
dividend is a sub-class of distribution, the reverse is not true, a distribution is not
a sub-set of dividend. It also clearly provides that distributions can be more than
distributions of equity and specifically include money, property or any other
forms.
Similarly, § 31A-5-418, also cited by LWP, explicitly provides that a
dividend is a sub-set of distribution. It states that the broad category of
distributions can be effectuated but that the sub-set dividend cannot be paid
unless certain circumstances are satisfied. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-5-418.
Sections 31A-16-105(2)(c)(vii) and 31A-16-106(2)(b) use distribution and
dividend in the same way-a dividend is a sub-set of distribution.
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Finally, LWP's argument that use of the word "transfers" in § 31A-27320 and "preference" in § 31A-27-321 "strongly supports the conclusion that
Section 322 was only intended to reach distributions of equity of an insurer"
requires a giant constructional leap. Mem. Opp. at 21. Both those sections are
dealing with different situations (i.e., fraudulent transfers and voidable
preferences), and evidence nothing other than the legislature's use of different
concepts and methods of recovering assets. To somehow equate "preference"
and "transfers" as used in other sections with "distribution" is a non-sequitur.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court, misinterpreting § 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code,
incorrectly granted summary judgment to LWP. Wasatch Crest respectfully
asks the Utah Supreme Court to reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary
judgment in LWP's favor and find as follows: (1) consistent with the evidence
presented to the Trial Court, Wasatch Crest asks that this Court find that LWP
was an affiliate of Insurance and thereby in control of Insurance; (2) as an
affiliate of Insurance, Insurance is entitled to recoupment of any distribution
which includes monies paid for services rendered; (3) the only distributions
Insurance is not entitled to are dividends that are shown to be fair and
reasonable; and (4) that there were material issues of fact that precluded
summary judgment as to Mutual.
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DATED this 21 st day of August, 2006.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John P. Harrington
Cecilia M. Romero
Attorneys for the Liquidator
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